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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 2001, the Canadian Supreme Court unani-
mously held that barring "exceptional circumstances," requests for
extradition from Canada to another nation must be accompanied
by assurances from the requesting nation against seeking or
imposing capital punishment.1 The Court determined that the
extradition of an individual to a country where he or she may face
the death penalty violates Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,2 which encompasses the right to life.3 With
this holding, the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the position it
held ten years earlier, and put an end to Canada's practice of
extraditing individuals to the United States to face the death
penalty.4
However, in holding that unconditioned extradition' is gener-
1. United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 296 (Can.).
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985) [hereinafter Charter].
3. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 289.
4. See generally Kindler v. Canada, [19911 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.). In this case, the
Canadian Supreme Court held that the decision by the Minister of Justice of Canada
to allow the extradition of a suspect to the United States to face the death penalty did
not violate the "right to life" provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Id. at 855. Canada subsequently extradited Joseph John Kindler, who
had previously been convicted and sentenced to death by a Pennsylvania jury before
he escaped to Canada, to the United States without assurances that the death penalty
would not be imposed. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Canada's reversion of its
common practice of extraditing people to the United States without seeking
assurances against imposition or execution of the death penalty.
5. In this comment "unconditioned extradition" refers to extradition by a
requested country to a requesting country without assurances from the requesting
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ally unconstitutional, the Canadian Supreme Court failed to
define "exceptional circumstances" or discuss the criteria neces-
sary for a showing of exceptional circumstances.' Furthermore,
the Court based a part of the rationale for its holding on the inter-
national attitude towards capital punishment, and stated that the
international trend towards the abolition of capital punishment
and the practical and philosophical difficulties associated with the
death penalty, not the specific circumstances of the case at hand,
had motivated its decision.' Also, the Canadian Supreme Court
adopted a broader restriction on extradition than was necessary
based on the facts of the case, in which the individuals requested
for extradition were Canadian citizens.8 In essence, the Court
phrased its holding and rationale so broadly as to extend not just
to Canadian citizens that are requested by the United States to
stand trial for crimes committed in the United States, but also to
American citizens and residents accused of committing crimes in
America who thereafter fled to Canada.9
Section I of this comment will outline the practical history
and constitutionality of the death penalty in the United States. It
will also demonstrate how the United States Supreme Court had
previously suspended the death penalty but, after reconsideration,
decided to reinstate it, holding that capital punishment is consti-
tutionally permissible. Section II will summarize the history of
the death penalty in Canada. The history of capital punishment
in both nations will be utilized in Section III to illuminate the
practical and legislative history of extradition between Canada
and the United States. This section will focus primarily on extra-
dition in cases where the crimes allow for a potential sentence of
death. Then, Section IV of the article will address the history of
Canadian jurisprudence regarding extradition of criminals and
accused criminals to the United States without assurances
against the death penalty.
In Section V, this historical Canadian practice will be con-
country that the death penalty will not be sought or imposed by the requesting
country.
6. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 290.
7. See id. at 287-88, 323.
8. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 523
(2005).
9. See id. Compare infra Part VI.B for a discussion of the Burns holding and the
potential extraterritorial extension of Canadian law to American citizens with infra
Part VLC for a discussion of the Burns holding and Canada's potential refusal to
extradite suspected terrorists.
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trasted with United States v. Burns - the 2001 landmark case
that ended Canada's practice of unconditioned extradition to the
United States. It will also examine how the Canadian Supreme
Court reached its decision that extradition to a non-abolitionist
country like the United States must be accompanied by assur-
ances that the country to which the criminal is to be extradited
will not seek or impose the death penalty, barring "exceptional cir-
cumstances." Section VI of this comment next explores the poten-
tially problematic result of the Canadian Supreme Court's holding
that unconditioned extradition is unconstitutional barring excep-
tional circumstances. It will discuss how this potential problem is
heightened for the United States in light of the current political
climate; specifically, during the war on terrorism. Finally, in Sec-
tion VII, this article concludes by suggesting situations that
should constitute the "exceptional circumstances" required by the
Burns court.
II. THE PRACTICAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
A. The Origins of Capital Punishment
To better understand the current state of United States-
Canadian extradition in potential capital punishment cases, it is
necessary to examine the history of the death penalty in both
nations. When European settlers came to America, they brought
with them the practice of capital punishment.' ° The first recorded
execution in the new colonies was in 1608, and laws regarding the
death penalty varied from colony to colony." Throughout the
nineteenth century, each state individually adopted its own laws
regarding capital punishment - although some states abolished
the death penalty, most states opted to retain it. 2 From the 1920s
to the 1940s, there was a resurgence of the death penalty in the
United States; however, in the 1950's, public sentiment began to
turn away from capital punishment as many of the United States'
allies abolished the death penalty. 3 In 1972, however, despite
America's retention and utilization of the death penalty for almost
10. See Death Penalty Information Center, Part I: History of the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=15&did=410 (last visited Jan. 5,






350 years, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that
essentially suspended capital punishment.
B. The Suspension of the Death Penalty in America
as Unconstitutional
For many years, the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution were interpreted as permitting the
death penalty.14 However, in the early 1960's, the fundamental
legality of the death penalty was challenged on the grounds that it
was a "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment." This issue was resolved in the
1972 landmark case Furman v. Georgia, where the Supreme
Court held that Georgia's death penalty statute, which gave the
jury complete sentencing discretion, could result in arbitrariness
and was therefore "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of
the Eighth Amendment." Separate opinions by Justices Marshall
and Brennan actually stated that the death penalty itself was
unconstitutional; however, Furman narrowly held that specific
state death penalty statutes, not capital punishment in general,
were unconstitutional.17 With this decision the Court voided forty
states' death penalty statutes, thus commuting the sentences of
629 death row inmates and effectively suspending the death pen-
alty in America. 8 This suspension would prove temporary, how-
ever, as lawmakers throughout the United States quickly made
changes to state capital punishment statutes. Their goal was to
create statutory standards that the Court would deem constitu-
tional, thus enabling the death penalty to be reinstated.
14. Id. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII, & XIV.
15. DPIC Part I, supra note 10. The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Note that Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Jackson v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 902 (1972); and Branch v.
Texas, 409 U.S. 902 (1972), are known collectively as Furman v. Georgia. The
Supreme Court consolidated Jackson v. Georgia, which was on certiorari to the Court,
and Branch v. Texas, which was on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, with the Furman decision.
17. Id. In a per curiam decision expressing the views of five members of the
Supreme Court, the Court held that "the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these [instant] cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. However, Justice White noted that
whether the death penalty is unconstitutional per se is not at issue in this case, and
thus need not be decided. Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
18. DPIC Part I, supra note 10.
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C. The Reinstatement of the Death Penalty in
America as Constitutional
The most significant issue that state lawmakers had to
address was that of arbitrariness as cited in Furman. To eliminate
these problems, states sought to limit jury discretion by providing
sentencing guidelines for the judge and jury when faced with the
task of deciding whether to impose the death penalty.19 In the
1976 landmark decision Gregg v. Georgia,2" the Supreme Court
approved the state-guided discretion statutes. In Gregg, the Court
held that the new death penalty statutes in Florida, Georgia, and
Texas were constitutional. Significantly, the Court also went one
step further and held that the death penalty itself was constitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment.2'
D. The Death Penalty in America Today
The Gregg decision set the standard for capital punishment
that the United States retains today.22 In April 1999 the United
Nations Human Rights Commission passed the Resolution Sup-
porting Worldwide Moratorium on Executions,2" which called on
countries that still maintain the death penalty to progressively
restrict the number of offenses for which the death penalty may be
imposed and to establish a moratorium on executions.24 The
United States voted against the resolution and, although more
than half of the countries in the international community have
abolished the death penalty, the United States retains capital
punishment as a viable sentence for various crimes.25 Currently,
thirty-six states have the death penalty, and ten of the states have
actually carried out executions.26
19. Id.
20. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Note that Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) are collectively referred to as the Gregg decision.
21. DPIC Part I, supra note 10; see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177, in which the Court
notes that "[i]t is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of
capital punishment was accepted by the Framers."
22. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
23. C.H.R. Res. 1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999).
24. Id. See also Death Penalty Information Center, Part II: History of the Death
Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgtarticle.php?scid=15&did=411 (last visited
Feb. 11, 2008) [hereinafter DPIC Part II].
25. Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty, http:ll
www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgfFactSheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) [hereinafter DPIC
Facts].
26. See DPIC Facts, supra note 25.
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The United States may have left itself in bad company: aboli-
tionists remind us that most of the world's democracies have abol-
ished capital punishment, and for some time only China and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo executed more people than the
United States.27 In 2006, other countries that vigorously enforced
the death penalty included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan.28
According to a statement by Amnesty International, 135 countries
have abolished the death penalty,29 and the entire Council of
Europe - which includes forty-five nations, ranging from Iceland
to Russia - now constitutes a death-penalty-free zone. °
Despite strong international opinion against capital punish-
ment, in 2006 the overall support of the death penalty in the
United States was sixty-five percent.31 However, although there is
national support for the death penalty and many individuals con-
victed of certain crimes in the United States remain eligible for
death, the number of death sentences per year has been dropping
dramatically since 1999.2 Ultimately, and for whatever reasons,
the United States retains the death penalty. Because individuals
choosing to live in America are subject to its laws, the death pen-
alty is currently a viable and constitutional method of punishment
for certain crimes in the United States.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CANADA
Next, we turn to the history of capital punishment in Canada.
At one time Canada imposed the death penalty, executing a total
of 710 people between 1867 and December 11, 1962, the date on
which the last execution was carried out.33 However, on July 14,
1976, the death penalty was abolished in Canada (with the excep-
tion of certain crimes under the National Defence Act).3 4 The deci-
sion to abolish the death penalty in 1976 came from the Canadian
27. Alan W. Clarke et. al., Does the Rest of the World Matter? Sovereignty,
International Human Rights Law and the American Death Penalty,30 QUEEN'S L.J.
260, 263 (2004).
28. Infoplease.com, The Death Penalty Worldwide, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/
A0777460.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).
29. Id.
30. Clarke, supra note 27, at 262.
31. DPIC Facts, supra note 25. However, it is important to note that all statistics
may vary according to the exact question asked.
32. Id.
33. Canadian Coalition Against the Death Penalty, The Death Penalty in Canada:
Facts, Figures, and Milestones, http://www.ccadp.org/deathpenalty-canada.htm (last
visited on Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter CCADP].
34. Id.
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Parliament, not a ruling of unconstitutionality by the Canadian
Supreme Court. 5 Interestingly, supporters of the death penalty
almost undid abolition, as evidenced by a 1987 vote in the House
of Commons where anti-death penalty supporters narrowly
defeated supporters of reinstating the death penalty. 6 In effect,
Canada officially became an abolitionist nation in the same year
the United States reverted to its position as a retentionist nation.
IV. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF EXTRADITION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Differences over capital punishment in Canada and the
United States naturally play a role in extradition practices
between the two nations, as extradition requests between the two
nations often involve capital cases. Extradition has been defined
as "'the surrender by one state, at the request of another [state], of
a person who is accused or has been convicted of a crime commit-
ted within the jurisdiction of the requesting state."'37 Extradition
is beneficial for both the requested and the requesting state. Pri-
marily, as noted by a Canadian judge, extradition protects the
public of the requesting country, as it allows that country to prose-
cute criminals who have escaped abroad. Extradition can also
deter criminals from seeking protection within the borders of
another country.3 9 Furthermore, in cooperating with extradition,
the requested country might benefit from future reciprocity from
the requesting country.4 ° Overall, the extradition process is cru-
cial to international relations, and thus, formalized extradition
procedures between nations around the world are not only com-
monplace but essential.
35. See id.
36. See id. In 1987, a vote regarding the reinstatement of the death penalty was
held in the House of Commons. The result of the vote was in favor of maintaining the
abolition of the death penalty, 148 to 127 - a margin of only 21 votes. Id.
37. James D. McCann, United States v. Jamieson: The Role of the Canadian
Charter in Canadian Extradition Law, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 139, 141 (1997) (quoting
ANNE WARNER LA FOREST, LA FOREsT's EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA (1991).
38. See United States v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R.1469. Judge La Forest notes that
the importance of extradition for the protection of the Canadian public against crime
can scarcely be exaggerated. He continues by claiming that to afford that protection,
there must be arrangements that ensure prosecution not only of those who commit
crimes while they are physically in Canada and escape abroad, but also of those
whose acts abroad have criminal effects in this country. Id. at 141-2; see also
McCann, supra note 37.
39. E.g., McCann, supra note 37.
40. Id. at 141.
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A. Extradition Procedures between the United States
and Canada
Naturally, the United States and Canada have formalized
extradition procedures, which are necessary due to the ease of
travel across their common border. The Extradition Treaty
Between Canada and the United States41 was amended by the
1988 Protocol,42 forming what is now the current Extradition
Treaty.43 The Extradition Treaty provides a skeletal procedural
framework for extradition, and Canada's Extradition Act" pro-
vides the specific mechanism by which fugitives are extradited
from Canada.4  The Extradition Treaty and Extradition Act
involve a series of discrete steps, including a formal requisition by
the requesting state, the attainment of a Canadian arrest warrant
by the requesting state, and an extradition hearing in which sub-
stantive requirements must be met in order to extradite.46
In general, Canada and the United States have agreed to
extradite to one another individuals who are found in their terri-
tory, but have been charged with or convicted of offenses within
the territory of the other country.47 As a result, extradition is
quite common between Canada and the United States and has
been for some time.48 However, the Canadian Minister of Justice
has some discretion in deciding whether to extradite particular
individuals to the United States - in particular, this discretion is
crucial with regard to capital cases.49
41. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Can., Dec. 3, 1971-July 9, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 983
[hereinafter 1971 Treaty]. This treaty entered into force on March 22, 1976 after
multiple ratifications.
42. Protocol Amending the Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1998, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 101-17, 27 I.L.M. 422, [hereinafter1988 Protocol].
43. Hereinafter, Extradition Treaty refers to the 1971 Treaty as amended by the
1988 Protocol.
44. Extradition Act, R.S.C., ch. E-23 (1999) (Can.) [hereinafter Extradition Act].
The Extradition Act was repealed and replaced in both 1995 and 1999. Section 25 of
the Extradition Act gives the Minister of Justice of Canada the discretion to order a
fugitive to be surrendered for extradition. Id. at ch.E-25.
45. McCann, supra note 37, at 146.
46. See generally id. at 146-47.
47. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, art. 1.
48. See generally McCann, supra note 37, at n.31.
49. See generally John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking
a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993).
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B. United States-Canadian Extradition in Cases
Involving the Death Penalty
The Extradition Treaty directly addresses the issue of extra-
dition in cases involving capital punishment and allows the
requested state to refuse extradition unless the requesting state
provides assurances against the death penalty. 0 This affords the
Canadian Minister of Justice the discretion to refuse a formal
extradition request by the United States when the United States
does not provide assurances against capital punishment.5 Still,
the Minister's power is completely discretionary and for years had
not been invoked. 2 In fact, Canada has consistently extradited
criminals and accused criminals - both American citizens and
non-American citizens - to America without requiring assur-
ances against imposing or executing the death penalty.
V. CANADA'S HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF
UNCONDITIONED EXTRADITION
A. The Case of Joseph John Kindler
One example of the Canadian practice of extraditing individu-
als to America without requiring assurances against imposing or
executing the death penalty is the case of Joseph John Kindler.
On November 15, 1983, a jury in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
found Kindler, an American citizen, guilty of first degree murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. 3 Kindler beat his
victim in the head with a baseball bat before dragging him to a
50. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, art. 6. Article 6 reads: "When the
offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the laws of the
requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit such punishment
for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State provides
assurances as the requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty shall
not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed." It is interesting to note that at
the time of the Treaty's negotiation in 1971, Canada retained the death penalty and
the United States did not (the United States Supreme Court had ruled capital
punishment unconstitutional in the Furman case). See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 239-40. However, when the Treaty went into effect in 1976, the United States
had reinstated the death penalty (the Court had subsequently ruled capital
punishment constitutional in the Gregg decision), while Canada had since abolished
it. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Ironically, the very clause that has
created a barrier for the United States with regard to Canadian extradition is a clause
that the United States itself requested be included in the Extradition Treaty.
51. Pak, supra note 49, at 240.
52. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Canada's history of extraditing
individuals to the United States without the Minister of Justice requesting
assurances against the imposition or execution of the death penalty.
53. See Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 794 (Can.).
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nearby river, where Kindler tied a cinder block to the victim's
neck and threw him in the river still alive.5 4 However, in Septem-
ber 1984, before formal imposition of the death sentence, Kindler
escaped from prison in Pennsylvania and successfully fled to
Canada.55
Kindler was subsequently arrested by Canadian authorities
near St. Adele, Quebec after living undetected for some time as a
fugitive, and on July 3, 1985, the United States formally
requested that Canada extradite Kindler pursuant to the Extradi-
tion Treaty. 6 Although Kindler attempted to secure a request for
Article 6 assurances against imposition or execution of the death
penalty from the United States, the Minister of Justice of Canada,
in his discretion, refrained from seeking such assurances.57 Ulti-
mately, Kindler's final appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court
was dismissed, and on September 26, 1991, the court affirmed the
Minister's order for the unconditioned extradition of Joseph John
Kindler to the United States.
Importantly, the Kindler case stood for the broad holding that
the extradition of an individual to America to face the death pen-
alty did not violate either the "cruel and unusual punishment" or
the "right to life" provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.59  In making this determination, the Canadian
Supreme Court considered factors such as the attitude of Canada
towards the death penalty and extradition, as well as the need to
preserve an effective extradition policy and to deter American
criminals from fleeing to Canada to avoid prosecution." The court
concluded that although Canada had abolished capital punish-
ment, the imposition of the death penalty by a foreign state for a
54. Id. at 835.
55. Id. at 794.
56. See id. See generally Extradition Treaty, supra note 43.
57. See Pak, supra note 49, at 250. In this comment, "Article 6 assurances" refers
to Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty, which provides that a country which has
received an extradition request from another nation may require assurances against
imposition or executing of the death penalty before acquiescing to extradition. See
also Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, art. 6.
58. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 780.
59. See id. at 846-59; Waters, supra note 8, at 520. See generally Charter, supra
note 2, s.7, s.12. Section 7 of the Charter reads, "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Section 12 of the Charter
reads, "Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment." Note that the rights in the Charter, unlike the rights in the United
States' Bill of Rights, are subject to explicit limitation and override.
60. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 850.
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crime committed in foreign territory did not "shock the conscience"
of the Canadian people." This was the first time that the Cana-
dian Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether assurances
against the death penalty must be sought by Canadian authorities
before extradition.62 Kindler, however, was not the only individual
extradited by Canada to the United States without assurances
against the death penalty; in fact, Kindler was one of many indi-
viduals extradited without conditions.
B. The Case of Charles Chitat Ng
Another example of past unconditioned Canadian extradition
is the case of Charles Chitat Ng. On July 6, 1985, Ng, a former
United States marine, was apprehended by security guards in
Calgary who caught him shoplifting.6" Not only did Ng resist
arrest and ultimately shoot and injure one of the security guards,
but at the time of his arrest Ng was carrying a mask, a knife, a
rope, cyanide capsules, a gun, and extra ammunition. 64 It subse-
quently became clear that Ng was a serial killer responsible for at
least twelve gruesome murders in California, and had escaped
incarceration and fled to Canada in order to evade multiple
charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted mur-
der, and kidnapping. 65 The United States formally requested that
Canada extradite Ng pursuant to the Extradition Treaty so that
Ng could stand trial in the United States.66 Although representa-
tions to request assurances against the death penalty were made
to the Minister of Justice on Ng's behalf, the Minister, in his dis-
cretion, chose not to seek the requested assurances from the
United States and ordered Ng's unconditioned extradition.
The Canadian Supreme Court discussed Ng's situation in the
Kindler opinion, and also concluded that extraditing Ng to the
United States to face the death penalty did not violate either the
"cruel and unusual punishment" or the "right to life" provisions of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.68 As in Kindler,
61. Id. at 849-53.
62. Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Shocks and Balances: United States v. Burns,
Fine-Tuning Canadian Extradition Law and the Future of the Death Penalty, 40
GONZ. L. REV. 293, 304-05 (2004-2005).
63. Reference re Ng Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858, 863 (Can.). This case was a
companion case to Kindler, as noted by Justice McLachlin in the Kindler opinion.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. See generally Extradition Treaty, supra note 43.
67. Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 863-64; see also Pak, supra note 49, at 251.
68. See Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 826-59.
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the court confirmed the order by the Minister of Justice for the
unconditioned extradition of Charles Chitat Ng on September 26,
1991.69
C. The Case of Roger Judge
As Kindler and Ng were in extradition proceedings, Roger
Judge, an American citizen, was serving 10 years in a British
Columbia prison for the beating and robbery of two people in Van-
couver.7 ° Judge had fled to Canada in 1987 after being convicted
of a double murder in Philadelphia, receiving a jury-imposed
death sentence, and fleeing from a Pennsylvania prison.71 Judge,
like Kindler and Ng, attempted to block his extradition by claim-
ing that unconditioned extradition to face the death penalty vio-
lated provisions of the Canadian Charter.72 However, in keeping
with the precedent set by the Canadian Supreme Court, the Que-
bec Superior Court denied Judge's argument. On August 7, 1988,
Judge was handed over to American federal and state authorities
without a Canadian request for assurances from the United States
against imposing or executing the death penalty.73
VI. UNITED STATES V. BURNS
One landmark case halted Canada's practice of unconditioned
extradition to the United States: United States v. Burns. On July
12, 1994 in Bellevue, Washington, Glen Sebastian Burns and Atif
Ahmad Rafay, both eighteen-year old Canadian citizens and
friends from high school, bludgeoned to death Rafay's mother,
father, and sister in their home.74 After the murders, Burns and
Rafay left the United States and traveled to Canada, where they
were eventually arrested. 7 The Attorney General of British
Columbia decided not to prosecute Burns and Rafay for the Wash-
ington murders; however, the State of Washington chose to prose-
cute the two men for the heinous crimes committed on American
soil. United States' authorities initiated proceedings to extradite
69. See Pak, supra note 49, at 252.
70. L. Stuart Ditzen, Canada Hands over Escaped Philadelphia Killer to U.S.
Authorities, PHIL. INQ., Aug. 8, 1998, at B03.
71. See id.
72. See id. See generally Charter, supra note 2, s.7, s.12. As aforementioned,
Section 7 is the "right to life" provision, and Section 12 is the "cruel and unusual
punishment" provision.
73. See Ditzen, supra note 70.
74. United States v. Bums, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 284 (Can.).
75. Id.
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Burns and Rafay to the United States. 6 The Minister of Justice of
Canada took Bums' and Rafay's age and Canadian citizenship
into consideration,77 but still decided to order their unconditioned
extradition pursuant to the Extradition Act. 8 This decision by the
Minister was in line with previous extradition decisions by former
Ministers, which had also been affirmed by the Canadian
Supreme Court.7 9
However, in a departure from precedent, the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal ruled that the Minister's unconditioned extra-
dition violated the rights of Burns and Rafay under Section 6 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. ° Subsequently,
the Canadian Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's broad
holding, and unanimously held that barring exceptional circum-
stances, extradition requests must be accompanied by assurances
against seeking or imposing capital punishment."
76. Id.
77. Burns and Rafay, unlike Kindler and Ng, are Canadian citizens. Kindler is an
American citizen, and Ng, although a Hong Kong national and British subject, is a
former United States marine and had resided in the United States for many years.
For a discussion of Burns' and Rafay's attempt to distinguish their situation from the
Kindler and Ng cases, see Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 314. The Minister of
Justice of Canada rejected this argument, as well as an argument based on Burns'
and Rafay's age, and determined that neither the age nor the nationality of the
accused constituted "exceptional circumstances" or the sort of situation contemplated
by the Kindler court that would shock the conscience of the Canadian people. For a
discussion of how it was previously determined that unconditioned extraditions do not
shock the conscience of the Canadian public, see supra Part IV.A.
78. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 284-85. The Minister of Justice, in the discretion
provided to him by Section 25 of the Extradition Act, chose not to seek assurances
against imposition or execution of the death penalty from the United States under
Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty. Id.
79. See generally Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 (Can.); Reference re Ng
Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858 (Can.). See supra Part IV.A-B for a discussion of
these cases.
80. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 285. The Court of Appeal held that the Minister's
unconditioned extradition order would violate the mobility rights of Burns and Rafay
under Section 6(1) of the Charter. Section 6(1) reads, "Every citizen of Canada has
the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada." Charter, supra note 2, s.6(1).
81. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 285-90. The Canadian Supreme Court declined to
affirm the Court of Appeal's narrow holding that the Minister's unconditioned
extradition order would violate the mobility rights of Burns and Rafay under Section
6(1) of the Charter, stating that on its own, Section 6(1) of the Charter does not
invalidate an extradition without assurances against capital punishment. Instead,
the court noted that the analysis was appropriate under Section 7 of the Charter,
which provides everyone not only the right to life, but also the right not to be deprived
of life unless it is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The court
explained that factors for and against extradition without assurances must be
balanced under Section 7, and ultimately held that after such a balancing test an
extradition of Burns and Rafay could not be justified. More broadly, the court held
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A. The Burns Balancing Test
In Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court engaged in a balanc-
ing process, weighing factors for and against extradition without
assurances under Section 7 of the Charter. 2 This balancing test,
which the court states is the proper analytical approach for such a
situation, was initially mandated by Kindler and Ng, neither of
which, as the court noted, provides a blanket approval on uncondi-
tioned extraditions. The Court noted that since the balancing
process is a flexible instrument, it is possible that some circum-
stances may tip the balance against extradition of a suspect with-
out assurances against imposing or executing the death penalty. 4
In Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court discussed the factors
in favor of extradition without assurances. Specifically, the court
mentioned the following: (1) if assurances are sought by the Cana-
dian government and refused by the United States, it is possible
that the accused would never stand trial, which would fly in the
face of the commonly recognized principle that those accused of a
crime should be brought to trial to determine the truth of the
charges; (2) justice is best served by a trial within the jurisdiction
where the crime allegedly occurred and the harmful impact was
felt; (3) in choosing to leave Canada for a foreign state, people
effectively relinquish themselves of the protections of Canadian
law, and must accept the local law of the foreign state to which
they travel, even if that law differs from Canadian law and
includes capital punishment; and (4) extradition is an important
aspect of comity and fairness between cooperating states that
share the common goal of bringing fugitives to justice with a fair
trial. However, these considerations were ultimately dismissed,
as the Court made clear that it believed the factors against uncon-
ditioned extradition to be weightier.86 In fact, the Court's discus-
sion of the four main factors in favor of unconditioned extradition
occupy only a few paragraphs in the case, while over fifty
paragraphs in Burns are dedicated to discussing the factors
that unconditioned extradition is unconstitutional in all but exceptional cases. Id.
This broad holding further departed from the Court of Appeal's holding, which had its
roots in Section 6(1) of the Charter, because the Canadian Supreme Court's holding
applied to all individuals, not just Canadian citizens.
82. Id. at 289.
83. Id. at 323.
84. Id. at 323, 355-56.
85. Id. at 286-87.
86. See generally id.
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against unconditioned extradition.87
According to the Canadian Supreme Court in Burns, the fac-
tors in favor of extraditing only with assurances against the death
penalty tilt the balance in the opposite direction of the Kindler
and Ng cases.8" Among the considerations discussed by the Court
were Canada's own abolition of the death penalty and the "death
row phenomenon," in which the final nature of the death penalty
combines with a lengthy appeal process to exacerbate the psycho-
logical trauma to death row inmates.8 9 However, the bulk of the
Court's opinion focuses on the possibility of wrongful convictions
and the declining domestic and international toleration of capital
punishment.90
Regarding the possibility of wrongful convictions, the Cana-
dian Supreme Court stated that concern over such mistakes had
become more significant since Kindler and Ng were decided.91 The
Court listed and discussed multiple Canadian cases from the past
decade in which the accused was wrongfully convicted and served
jail time unnecessarily.92 The Court then moved to discuss the
United States' experience with capital punishment and analyzed
problems in the American judicial system that could play a role in
wrongful convictions, such as racial bias and poverty.93 The Court
listed a litany of American organizations and individuals that
have called for a moratorium on the death penalty, among them
the American Bar Association, the state or local bars of nine dif-
ferent states, the then-Governor of Illinois, and the Senator of
Wisconsin, and mentioned multiple cases in which convicts on
death row in the United States were subsequently exonerated.94
87. Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 317.
88. Id. at 315-16.
89. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 287-88. These considerations are listed by the court
in the first and fifth factors, respectively.
90. See generally id. See also Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 315-16.
91. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 288.
92. Id. at 337-41. One of the situations discussed by the court involved a man
named Donald Marshall, who served eleven years in prison for a conviction of
manslaughter before being exonerated; however, this occurred before the Ng and
Kindler cases. Id. at 337-38. The Court also discussed the case of David Milgaard,
who served twenty-two years in prison before subsequently being found innocent. Id.
at 338-39. The Court noted that Guy Paul Morin, Thomas Sophonow, and Gregory
Parsons were all subsequently exonerated after serving time for murder convictions.
Id. at 339-41. The Court alleged that had capital punishment been imposed in these
cases, the miscarriage of justice would have been irreparable and in violation of the
principles of fundamental justice. Id. at 341; see also Harvie & Foster, supra note 62,
at 320 n.209.
93. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 342.
94. Id. at 342-45. The Court noted that local or state bars in California,
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The overall problem with capital punishment, as noted by the
Court, is that despite everyone's best efforts, the judicial system
remains fallible; however, incarceration within the judicial system
is reversible while a death sentence is not. 5  The Canadian
Supreme Court stated that its knowledge of the extent of wrongful
convictions was not understood at the time it decided Kindler and
Ng; however, its current understanding of the situation was cited
as a significant factor in tipping the balancing test against uncon-
ditioned extradition.96
Regarding the declining domestic and international accept-
ance of the death penalty, the Canadian Supreme Court utilized
and discussed a variety of international sources and information.97
Primarily, the Court permitted written interventions by organiza-
tions such as the International Centre for Criminal Law &
Human Rights and the Senate of the Italian Republic and allowed
counsel for Amnesty International to speak at the hearing.9 The
Connecticut, Ohio, Virginia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania have called for a moratorium on executions. Id. at 342. The court also
noted that then-Governor George Ryan of Illinois declared a moratorium on
executions in Illinois, while Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin introduced a bill to
Congress in April 2000 that called on the federal government and all states that
impose the death penalty to suspend executions while a national commission
reviewed the administration of capital punishment in America. Id. at 343-44. The
court also mentioned the case of Anthony Porter, an American sitting on death row in
Illinois, who came within forty eight hours of being executed for a crime he did not
commit. Id. at 344.
95. Id. at 355-56.
96. See id. at 337.
97. Reliance on international statutes and policies demonstrates a difference
between the Canadian Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, as the
United States Supreme Court is hesitant to look to international law and attitudes,
and generally utilizes only American case law, statutory law, and precedent when
asserting a claim. Recently, the Court has begun to incorporate international
considerations into its decisions, acknowledging the overwhelming weight of the
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty to find that the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Still, this reliance on international attitudes is
not entirely accepted by the Court. Id. at 624. In fact, the Roper decision was decided
by a margin of only one vote, with Justice Scalia dissenting against the majority's
reliance on the opinions and initiatives of other countries. Id. See generally Cindy G.
Buys, Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich Response to the
Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation, 21 BYU
J.PUB. L. 1 (2007) for a detailed discussion of the Court's recent issuance of several
high-profile opinions that utilize international and foreign law. Buys' article also
examines the controversy that has been sparked among the Justices, legal scholars,
and politicians over the proper use of international and foreign law in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Id.
98. See Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 294; see also Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at
316 n.179.
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Court noted that there is currently an international trend against
the death penalty, drawing upon various international treaty pro-
visions and United Nations' resolutions as an illustration of the
international momentum towards abolition of capital punish-
ment.99 The Court conceded that this data does not establish an
international law norm or mandate against capital punishment or
extradition involving capital punishment. 10 However, as Canada
has done in the past, the Court here treated international law and
opinion on the death penalty as compelling authority.0 1
The tendency of Canadian courts to consider developments in
international law in reaching a decision can be explained by the
fact that until the 1980's Canada was not formally separated from
its British motherland. 02 Thus, Canada has continuously looked
to the European community in defining its social and legal charac-
ter, specifically with regard to Canada's relations with other
nations. 03 In Burns, the Court's consideration of the international
movement against capital punishment, combined with Canada's
abolitionist attitude, outweighed the individualized facts of the
situation.04 As the Canadian Supreme Court noted, "[t]he out-
come of this appeal [from the Minister's decision to allow the
unconditioned extradition of Burns and Rafay] turns more on the
practical and philosophic difficulties associated with the death
penalty that have increasingly preoccupied the courts and legisla-
tors in Canada, the United States and elsewhere rather than on
the specific circumstances of the respondents in this case."105
B. Beyond Merely a Balancing Test to a Per Se Rule
and an Unnecessarily Broad Holding
In the six years since Burns, scholars have noted that not-
withstanding the Canadian Supreme Court's discussion and utili-
zation of a balancing test, in actuality, the Court moved towards a
per se rule.0 6 It has been suggested that the Burns holding is
99. See Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 356, 332-34; see also Waters, supra note 8, at 523
n.163.
100. See Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 334.
101. See Thomas Rose, A Delicate Balance: Extradition, Sovereignty, and




104. See Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 323.
105. Id.
106. See Alan Clarke, Justice in a Changed World: Terrorism, Extradition, and the
Death Penalty, 29 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 783, 799 (2003); see also Harvie & Foster,
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much like a conclusive presumption, and that although the
Court's language is consistent with an ad hoc approach, the ratio-
nale underlying the holding is absolutist.107 Many of the reasons
provided by the Court as support for its refusal to allow the uncon-
ditioned extradition of Burns and Rafay revolve around issues -
such as the international trend against capital punishment -
that could not reasonably be fixed by any retentionist nation.08
Furthermore, many of the reasons provided by the Court that the-
oretically could be fixed essentially create a Hobson's choice for a
retentionist nation.0 9 Essentially, an argument can be made that
although Burns discusses a balancing test, it relies on an absolu-
tist foundation and thus provides for the per se approach that an
agreement by Canada to extradite to a retentionist nation must
always be accompanied by assurances against the death
penalty. 11°
The fact that the Burns holding potentially creates a bright-
line rule against unconditioned Canadian extradition makes its
effect even stronger. For example, after engaging in the balancing
process, the Court pronounced its general holding that assurances
against imposing or executing the death penalty are constitution-
ally necessary for extradition in all but exceptional circum-
stances.' As such, in Burns, the Minister of Justice's decision to
allow the unconditioned extradition of Burns and Rafay to the
United States constituted a violation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms."2 However, the Court specifically declined
to explain what constitutes exceptional circumstances, stating
supra note 62, at 322 (arguing that through the Burns holding "Canada has gone from
a rule that was highly deferential to executive decision-making, requiring assurances
only in exceptional extraditions, to [a rule] that, as a matter of constitutional law,
requires assurances in all extraditions, leaving only a bare possibility that there
might be exceptions.").
107. Clarke, supra note 106, at 801.
108. Id. at 799.
109. Id. at 800-03. Clarke notes that in focusing on both the innocence argument
and the "death row phenomenon," the Canadian Supreme Court presents a
conundrum in Burns because "It]he [two] criteria cut against each other such that if
you satisfy one, you are forced to violate the other - repair the length of stays on
death row at the expense of increasing the probability of executing the innocent." Id.
at 803. Harvie and Foster also note that "[blecause the heart of the court's reasoning
[in Burns] is the innocence argument, it is difficult to imagine how a retentionist state
might modify its capital punishment regime so as to fit into such an exception [of
"exceptional circumstances."]" Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 322.
110. Clarke, supra note 106, at 803.
111. Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 289-90.
112. See id. The Canadian Supreme Court held that extradition without
assurances against imposing or executing the death penalty violates the "right to life"
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that "[t]his case does not present the exceptional circumstances
that must be shown."1 1
3
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted a broader restriction
on extradition than was necessary based on the facts of the case."'
This broad holding by the Canadian Supreme Court was a depar-
ture from the lower court's holding, which distinguished Burns
from Kindler because Burns and Rafay were Canadian citizens,
and as such, were entitled to view Canada as a safe haven -
meaning Burns and Rafay, unlike Kindler and Ng, should be able
to benefit from Canada's protections and its abolition of the death
penalty." 5 The Court phrased its holding and rationale so broadly
as to extend not only to Canadian citizens wanted for trial for
crimes committed in the United States, but also to American citi-
zens and residents accused of committing crimes in America and
subsequently fleeing to Canada.1 16 To say that this holding - spe-
cifically, the broad phrasing and even more sweeping application
- is undesirable for the United States is an understatement. The
reality of the situation is that the Burns holding is potentially dis-
astrous for America and its jurisprudence.
VII. THE PROBLEMATIC RESULT OF THE BURNS HOLDING
FOR THE UNITED STATES
The Canadian Supreme Court's holding in Burns has opened
the floodgates to problems for the United States. In holding that
Canadian extradition to other countries must, barring exceptional
situations, be accompanied by assurances that the receiving coun-
try will not seek or enforce the death penalty, the Canadian
Supreme Court did not define what constituted "exceptional cir-
cumstances." " In fact, the Court purposefully refrained from
attempting to anticipate any exceptional circumstances.118 The
Court's reluctance to define or describe "exceptional circum-
stances" could be explained as an attempt by the Canadian
Supreme Court to maintain an open dialogue between itself and
the elected branches of government.1 9 Alternatively, the Court
provision of Section 7 of the Charter, which is effectuated by Section 1 of the Charter.
Id.
113. Id. at 290.
114. Waters, supra note 8, at 523.
115. See Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 300; see also Waters, supra note 8, at 523.
116. See Waters, supra note 8, at 523.
117. Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 290.
118. Id. at 323.
119. See Kent Roach, Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve
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could have reasoned that since unforeseen or unconsidered cir-
cumstances might arise, constituting an exceptional case, it would
be unwise either to state a per se rule or explicitly define what
might constitute "exceptional circumstances. "120
However, regardless of the Court's rationale, there remains
no clear definition of what circumstances would permit an uncon-
ditioned Canadian extradition. As a result, a situation might
arise in which the United States government requests the extradi-
tion of an individual from Canada and does not, for reasons that
American governmental officials consider compelling, want to pro-
vide assurances against the imposition or execution of the death
penalty. Thus, in awaiting a determination on the extradition sta-
tus of that individual, the United States can merely speculate as
to whether the Canadian Supreme Court will deem those particu-
lar circumstances to be "exceptional," and whether the Canadians
will allow the individual to return to America to stand trial.
A. Canada's Potential Extraterritorial Extension of Its
Laws to American Citizens
Not only does the definition of "exceptional circumstances"
remain unclear, but after Burns, a question arises as to whether
Canada's ban on unconditioned extraditions is a type of illicit
extraterritorial extension of Canadian law to other countries.
121
The Court's holding in Burns is rooted in the "right to life" provi-
sion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 122 How-
ever, the United States, as a sovereign nation, is not bound by the
Canadian Charter; in fact, the Charter has no bearing whatsoever
on American decisions and jurisprudence.
Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism, 47 McGILL L.J. 893, 925 (2002). The
effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City were felt by
countries around the world, especially by nations contiguous to the United States.
After these attacks, there was much discussion among Canadian scholars and
politicians concerning communication between the appointed courts and the elected
members of government. Although it is possible that in refusing to define
"exceptional circumstances," the Canadian Supreme Court wanted to keep a channel
open for dialogue, it has been suggested that such dialogue "should require the
passage of legislation and resulting democratic debate about and accountability for
the government's decision to limit or override rights." Id.
120. Id.
121. See Rose, supra note 101, at 207. In his comment, Rose states that "[iun
denying extradition, the Court [sic] also expanded the doctrine of extraterritoriality
... [iun the instant case, the [Canadian] Supreme Court looked to the U.S. penal
system, compared it with the Canadian system, weighed the nation's perception of
'fundamental principles of justice,' and found the U.S. system deficient." Id.
122. See Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 289.
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Of course, the United States is bound by the Constitution,
which also discusses a right to life and states that no one is to be
deprived of life without due process of law.123 However, American
jurisprudence recognizes the current American criminal justice
system, albeit flawed at times, as due process of law, and also rec-
ognizes the death penalty as an appropriate and constitutional
sentence imposed on people through due process. Thus, despite
the views of some scholars,124 an argument can be made that the
Burns holding is an extension of Canadian law to American citi-
zens. Such an extension is problematic, not only on its face, but
also because American law is substantively different from Cana-
dian law regarding a "right to life" and regarding when such a
right can be curtailed.
B. Canada's Potential Refusal to Extradite Suspected
Terrorists
Canada's potential extraterritorial extension of Canadian law
to American citizens is not the only problematic result of the
Burns holding. As previously discussed, situations that constitute
the "exceptional circumstances" needed for unconditioned Cana-
dian extradition are unknown, and America can only speculate as
to what circumstances might suffice to enable an individual to be
extradited from Canada to the United States without assurances
against imposing or executing the death penalty. In a post-9/11
world and in light of the current political climate in America -
specifically, America's prosecution of suspected terrorists1 5 and
al-Qaeda participants - the question of whether Canada will
unconditionally extradite these individuals naturally arises. In
other words, one wonders if suspected involvement in a terrorist
attack would constitute the "exceptional circumstances" required
by the Burns case.
Scholars and commentators differ on this issue. Some schol-
ars believe that if the Canadian Supreme Court ever finds a situa-
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in part, "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
124. See Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 325. Harvie and Foster argue that
"[tiechnically, the court has simply said that it would be a violation of section seven of
the Charter for the Canadian government to send someone currently in Canada to
another state to face possible execution. The Charter is therefore not being applied to
a foreign government." Id.
125. In this comment, "suspected terrorists" refers to individuals who are suspected




tion in which the "exceptional circumstances" warrant
unconditioned extradition, it is more likely than not that the situ-
ation will involve al-Qaeda suspects or other accused terrorists.126
Other scholars note that most nations that have abolished the
death penalty are unlikely to extradite anyone, even suspected
members of al-Qaeda, if the accused faces a realistic possibility of
receiving a death sentence in the United States.'27
If Canada looks to European nations for guidance, as it has
done in the past,'28 in deciding whether extradition requests for
suspected members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations
constitute "exceptional circumstances," it is possible - and argua-
bly likely - that the result will be undesirable for the United
States. Spain has previously refused to extradite individuals sup-
posedly linked to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
unless the United States agreed not to seek the death penalty and
not to use military tribunals. 2 9 Although British law bars extradi-
tion where the death penalty could be imposed, the British gov-
ernment has said that it will hand any key terrorists over to the
Americas. 3 ' In some cases, British authorities have charged these
individuals for crimes in Great Britain; in doing so, the British
charges take precedence over the American extradition request.
This allows British authorities to wait until after the trials in
Britain have ended to deal with the potentially problematic situa-
tion raised by extradition to a country that retains the death
penalty.' 3
126. See Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 324.
127. See Clarke, supra note 106, at 807; Harvie & Foster, supra note 62, at 327.
Harvie and Foster note that "[iut remains to be seen ... whether some new horror
causes the Canadian court, in some future extradition case involving an appalling
crime, to decide that assurances are not required," before concluding that such an
event is not likely to occur any time soon. Id.
128. See supra Part V.B for a discussion of how Canada has continuously looked to
the European community in defining its social and legal character, specifically with
regard to Canada's international relations.
129. See Clarke, supra note 106, at 808; Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A
Nation Challenged: The Legal Front; Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2001, at Al.
130. Kyle M. Medley, The Widening of the Atlantic: Extradition Practices Between
the United States and Europe, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2003). Although then-
British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon had originally announced that Britain would
not hand anyone over to the United States to face the death penalty, including Osama
bin Laden, the British government subsequently reversed its stance and publicly
acknowledged that it would promptly hand over key terrorists to the Americans. Id.
at 1213-14.
131. See Lizette Alvarez, Britain Charges Muslim Cleric Sought by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2004, at A14. Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical Muslim cleric, was
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Germany has also previously refused to extradite Islamic
militants and accused terrorists to countries where they face the
possibility of capital punishment. 3 2 Finally, although there was
no extradition issue involved, France's strong opposition to the
prosecution of French citizen and convicted al-Qaeda member
Zacarias Moussaoui demonstrates that no terrorist will be extra-
dited from France without assurances against capital punish-
ment.3 ' In sum, if Canada looks to European countries to
determine how to handle extradition requests of suspected ter-
rorists and al-Qaeda members, it is quite possible that Canada
will determine that the "exceptional circumstances" necessitated
by the Burns case are not present and will refuse to extradite sus-
pected terrorists to the United States without assurances against
the death penalty.
C. The Ultimate Result of the Burns Holding:
A Canadian "Safe Haven"
Thus, it seems terrorists, American criminals, and other indi-
viduals who commit crimes in the United States that carry a
potential capital sentence may flee to Canada to avoid the death
penalty, thereby using Canada as a "safe haven." This possibility
of a "safe haven" for American criminals is extremely problematic.
Primarily, a Canadian "safe haven" allows American citizens and
residents to circumvent the United States' judicial process, which
in many states includes capital punishment. The possibility of a
Canadian "safe haven" for convicted and accused criminals was
discussed and ultimately dismissed by the Canadian Supreme
Court in Burns as an unrealistic concern. 34 The Court felt that
extradition to face the death penalty and extradition to face life in
prison both equally prevented a fugitive from using Canada as a
"safe haven."'35 However, despite the belief of the Burns Court, it
arrested by the British antiterrorism police on a United States extradition warrant.
Id. He faces eleven charges in the United States, including hostage taking and
providing material support to al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies in Afghanistan. Id. In
Britain, he was charged with sixteen offenses, including inciting racial hatred,
possessing threatening or incendiary sound and video recordings, and having a
terrorist document in his possession on the day he was arrested. Id.
132. See Clarke, supra note 106, at 807; Germany Targets Muslim Groups, BBC
News, Dec. 12, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1705606.stm.
133. See Clarke, supra note 106, at 808.
134. See Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 289. See supra Part V.A. for a discussion of other
factors for and against unconditioned extradition that were considered by the
Canadian Supreme Court in Burns.
135. See id. In Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that "[wihether
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seems clear that if an individual is simply trying to escape the
imposition of the death penalty, the Burns holding creates a Cana-
dian "safe haven" that enables him to achieve that goal.
It is not inconceivable that an individual would flee to Canada
only to escape the death penalty. The aforementioned cases of
Joseph John Kindler and Roger Judge'36 demonstrate that individ-
uals have fled to Canada after being sentenced to death. In a post-
Burns world, if an individual were to receive the death penalty
through the American penal system and subsequently escape to
Canada, such as Kindler or Judge, one wonders if that individual's
situation would constitute the "exceptional circumstances" neces-
sitated by the Burns court or if extradition of the individual would
be refused by the Canadian government unless assurances
against executing the death sentence were given by the United
States. If the latter situation were to occur, then the individual
would have succeeded in creating a Canadian "safe haven" for
himself.
VIII. CAN THE POSSIBLE EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF
CANADIAN LAW AND THE CREATION OF A CANADIAN
"SAFE HAVEN" BE HALTED?
As discussed, there is strong rationale for concluding that
when the United States requests the extradition of an American
citizen to stand trial for a capital case, Canada is extraterritorially
extending its law to the American citizen. In other words, it is
likely that Canada will refuse the American government's extradi-
tion request unless Canada has been provided assurances that the
death penalty will not be sought once the individual has reached
the United States. Canada will take this position because it has
itself abolished the death penalty as a punishment for crimes -
despite the fact that the requesting nation, here the United
States, retains and utilizes the death penalty for individuals who
have committed capital crimes within the United States. Further-
more, this article has demonstrated that there is clear support for
concluding that Canada will even refuse to extradite convicted
fugitives are returned to a foreign country to face the death penalty or to face
eventual death in prison from natural causes, they are equally prevented from using
Canada as a 'safe haven.' Elimination of a 'safe haven' depends on vigorous law
enforcement rather than on infliction of the death penalty by a foreign state after the
fugitive has been removed from this country." Id.
136. The cases of Joseph John Kindler and Roger Judge are discussed supra Parts
V.A. and IV.C., respectively.
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and accused terrorists to the United States if capital punishment
remains a feasible sentencing option for certain crimes.
These possibilities combine to create the realistic option of a
Canadian "safe haven" for criminals. Convicted and accused
criminals alike, both American citizens and nationals of other
countries who are involved in terrorist activities, can rest assured
in knowing that if they commit a gruesome crime on American soil
or if they execute an act of terrorism that devastates thousands of
American lives, they are free from the possibility of paying for that
crime with their own lives simply by crossing the Canadian bor-
der. Such a situation creates a multitude of troubles for the
United States. What is even more problematic for the Canadian
government is that such a situation also gives rise to terrible con-
sequences for America's northern neighbor.
The refusal of the Canadian government to extradite these
individuals to the United States endangers Canadian citizens, as
a Canadian "safe haven" makes it more likely that these violent
and impenitent criminals, once they have fled to Canada, will
migrate to Canadian towns and cities and attempt to live amongst
the Canadian people. Often, these individuals retain their vicious
and dangerous ways and put the Canadian public with whom they
interact at risk. Skeptics may argue that any true risk posed by
these individuals to the Canadian community is remote. How-
ever, although it may be infrequent that individuals who have fled
to Canada to escape detection of their crime or to use Canada as a
"safe haven" will then turn violent on the Canadian public, the
fact remains that such instances do occur, 137 and can be extremely
harmful to the lives of Canadian residents.
In the current post-Burns world, it is likely that Canada will
refuse to extradite individuals to the United States to stand trial
without American assurances against imposing or executing the
137. The case of Roger Judge illustrates one example in which an individual who
had fled to Canada to escape the execution of a death sentence turned violent on the
Canadian public. Judge, a convicted double murderer, beat and robbed two people in
Vancouver. See supra Part IV.C. The case of Charles Chitat Ng presents another
example in which an individual who fled to Canada to avoid detection of his crimes in
the United States turned violent on the Canadian community. Ng shot and injured a
security guard in Calgary. Even more frightening, however, was that at the time of
Ng's arrest he was carrying a mask, a knife, a rope, cyanide capsules, a gun, and extra
ammunition. It was later discovered that these materials were amongst the
materials used by Ng in California to torture and murder at least twelve people, some
of whom spent their final days in an underground bunker used by Ng as a torture
chamber. Thus, it is not a far leap to infer that Ng planned to use these same
materials to torture and murder potential Canadian victims. See supra Part IV.B.
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death penalty. To do so would, as the Burns court noted, "shock
the conscience" of the Canadian people.13 Ultimately, the Cana-
dian government has created a situation where criminals will not
only remain in Canadian custody awaiting an extradition agree-
ment that satisfies both nations, but the Canadian government
has also created a circumstance where violent and dangerous indi-
viduals will flee from the United States and live amongst the
Canadian public until they are detected by authorities or commit
an act of violence against Canadian residents. Such an outcome
begs the question of whether, if by allowing such a situation to
persist and by continuously endangering the lives of the Canadian
people, the actions of the Canadian government in this situation
"shock the conscience" of the Canadian people.
However, there is a middle ground that can resolve the afore-
mentioned: a narrower interpretation and application of "excep-
tional circumstances." Situations where the individual who has
been requested by the United States for extradition from Canada
to America is an American citizen should constitute the "excep-
tional circumstances" necessitated by the Burns Court. In other
words, such a situation should not require assurances by the
United States against imposing or executing the death penalty.
This construction of "exceptional circumstances" would apply to
any American citizen, regardless of whether they have been con-
victed of a crime in the United States and escaped to Canada 139 or
are simply wanted to stand trial in the United States.4 '
Such an interpretation would respect the right of Canada to
apply its own laws to its own citizens, such as Burns and Rafay,
who commit crimes in America and return to Canada. Further-
more, such an interpretation would enable Canada to extend its
laws to nationals of other countries who seek protection within
Canadian borders. Nevertheless, this interpretation would bar
the extraterritorial extension of Canadian law to American citi-
138. See generally Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. at 283. The Burns court determined that
for Canada to extradite Burns and Rafay to the United States without assurances
against the imposition or execution of the death penalty violated Canadian principles
of fundamental justice, and as such, "[ain extradition that violates the principles of
fundamental justice will always shock the conscience." Id. at 325. See the case of
Joseph John Kindler for a discussion of how the Canadian Supreme Court previously
determined that the imposition of the death penalty in a foreign state for a crime
committed in foreign territory did not shock the conscience of the Canadian people.
See supra Part V.A.
139. For example, individuals like Joseph John Kindler and Roger Judge. See supra
Parts IV.A., JV.C.
140. For example, an individual like Charles Chitat Ng. See supra Part IV.B.
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zens, thereby demonstrating that Canada respects the viewpoints
of its southern neighbor, albeit a position different from its own on
the issue of capital punishment.
Another situation that should constitute the "exceptional cir-
cumstances" necessitated by the Burns court is when the individ-
ual who has been requested by the United States for extradition
from Canada to America is an individual who has been convicted
of committing acts of terrorism or participating in a terrorist
organization. Note that in contrast to the previously mentioned
interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" regarding American
citizens, the interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" regard-
ing terrorists should only extend narrowly to those who have been
convicted of a crime involving terrorism, not more broadly to those
who are wanted to stand trial for charges of terrorism. Such a
compromise demonstrates that the American government respects
Canada's standpoint on capital punishment although dissimilar
from the position of the United States, and proves that America is
not extraterritorially extending American law unnecessarily. This
compromise would also signify respect for America's war on ter-
rorism 4 ' through attempts to bring convicted terrorists to justice.
Critics will argue that Canada, as a sovereign nation, is under
no obligation to compromise with any other country regarding an
individual who has both feet firmly planted on Canadian soil.
Furthermore, some critics may claim that the United States pres-
ently extends American law and attitudes extraterritorially,
drawing upon various situations in the current political climate as
support for such a claim. Some may quickly dismiss the possibil-
ity that a broad construction of "exceptional circumstances" will
result in a Canadian "safe haven." Such critics may, as the Cana-
dian Supreme Court noted in the Burns opinion, claim that any
American request for a narrower interpretation of "exceptional
141. Although the phrase "war on terrorism" has been used by the press to describe
various governmental initiatives throughout history, President George W. Bush
formally declared a war on terrorism in a speech given on September 20, 2001 by
stating, "[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated." George W. Bush, President, United States of America, Address to a Joint
Session of Congress and the American People in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
However, there remains a discrepancy among theorists, politicians, and even the
American population as to whether a "war on terrorism" exists as a real, tangible war
or whether "war on terrorism" is merely a descriptive phrase utilized by the Bush
administration and Bush supporters.
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circumstances" that is based in concern over a Canadian "safe
haven" is pretextual and unlikely.
However, suggesting a narrower interpretation of "excep-
tional circumstances" is not an attempt by the United States to
flex its muscles or to impose American laws and viewpoints on its
neighbor. It is also not an underhanded effort by America to dis-
suade criminals from fleeing to Canada, with some mistaken hope
that such a situation will make law enforcement and the criminal
justice process in the United States easier. Rather, extending the
"exceptional circumstances" necessitated by the Burns court to
American citizens and convicted terrorists creates an environment
that is safer for Canadian citizens, American citizens, and the
international community as a whole. Ultimately, it is an attempt
by one nation to reach a compromise with its neighboring nation,
while not only respecting the laws and attitudes of both sovereign
countries but also respecting the common goals of safety and jus-
tice for both nations' citizens.
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